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THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RIGHT OF ADULT
ADOPTEES TO KNOW THE IDENTITY OF
THEIR NATURAL PARENTS
Adoption is an ancient practice' that developed to guarantee the con-
tinued existence of the family as a social and economic unit.2 Today
the primary concern of adoption is the welfare of the child.' Thus, any
consideration of the needs of the natural parents or adoptive parents is
secondary to "the best interests of the child.' 4 To protect the interests
of those involved and to encourage the continuance of adoption, the
law deems all adoption proceedings, records, and papers confidential
and orders them sealed once the court decrees the adoption final.5 The
state protects the adoptee from any encroachment from the past, giving
the child a new identity, severing all bonds with natural parents,6 and
1. Chambers, TheAdoption of Strangers, 16 INTL J. COMP. SOC. 118 (1975). For a thorough
historical analysis, see Brosnan, The Law ofAdoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922) and Huard,
The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956). Chambers notes that the
form of adoption practiced in the United States is quite different from practices of other cultures.
Adoption among other cultures historically did not obliterate the identity of the adoptee and most
often involved the adoption of adults rather than infants. Chambers, supra, at 119. The American
pattern is also distinctive because marital pairs who already have natal children may adopt, adults
almost never adopt other adults, and a family may adopt more than one child. Id. at 118.
The most unique aspect of the American pattern of adoption is that it focuses on the infant and
in particular the unwanted infant. Many cultures, both ancient and modem, practiced infanticide
rather than showing concern for the unwanted child. W. SLINGERLAND, CHILD PLACING IN FAM-
ILIES 28 (1918); Presser, The Hiorical Background of the American Law ofAdoption, 11 J. FAM. L.
443. 446 n.18 (1971), citing 1 HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 78, 79, 87
(1904). See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1857, at 8, col. I for the reaction of nineteenth century American
reformers to the practice of infanticide.
2. Huard, supra note 1, at 743. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (10th ed. 1901) stating
that without the practice of adoption "society would scarcely have escaped its swaddling clothes. It
commanded the approval of the greatest number of archaic societies and has proven to be the
most durable of all artificial relationships designed to prolong the continuity of family existence."
Chinese tradition dictated that a childless male was entitled to claim the first born male child of
any of his younger brothers because "[o]ne of the gravest calamities to be apprehended by a
Chinaman is to die without leaving a male posterity to care for his ashes and decorate his grave,
thereby pacifying his wandering spirit in purgatory." Note, Laws of Adoption in China, 15 CHI.
L.N. 362 (1883) quoted in Presser, upra note 1, at 445-46 n.ll. See also Brosnan, supra note 1;
Quarles, The Law ofAdoption--A Legal Anomal?, 32 MARQ. L. REv. 237 (1949).
3. Huard, supra note 1, at 748-49; Presser, supra note 1, at 473-78.
4. Huard, supra note 1, at 749.
5. Id. at 752.
6. The general rule is that adoption terminates all existing rights and duties between the
adoptee and the natural parents. See, e.g., La Bove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp.
808, 813 (D.N.J. 1958), aft'd, 264 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1959); Smelser v. Southern Ry. Co., 148 F.
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closing all adoption records.
Adoptees currently are challenging this closure procedure. Many
adoptees feel compelled either to seek out their natural parents or to
discover information about their background.8 Statutory closure of
adoption records of the court and of the agency placing the child makes
adoptees' search for their natural parents difficult if not impossible.9
Adoptees argue that closure laws violate their right to know their ori-
gins.' 0 This demand for access presents the major controversy in the
Supp. 891, 893 (D. Tenn. 1956), affdsub noma., Meadors v. Smelser, 244 F.2d 719 (1957); In re
Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645, 291 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1972); Jones v. Jones, 215 Kan. 102, 112, 523 P.2d
743, 751, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974); In re Adoption of Giambrone, 262 So. 2d 566, 569
(La. App. 1972). Particularly interesting is the court's comparison in In re Adoption of Bryant,
134 Ind. App. 480, 488, 189 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1963), of an adoption to the death of a child. As one
commentator has stated, "[ilt is as though the state has decided that the child was never genealogi-
cally a part of anyone." Note, Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons: A Proposal To Amend
the linois Adoption Act, 6 Loy. U.L.J. 49, 51 n.18 (1975).
Although the goal of the adoption procedure is the severance of the adopted child from the
natural parents and the integration of that child into the adoptive family, in some jurisdictions the
laws of inheritance seem to counter that intent. See, e.g., Illinois Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
3, §§ 11, 12, 14 (1973). For a thorough analysis of this issue see Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession
By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Note, supra note 6, at 52-54. See
also Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 275 (1978).
Few courts have actually dealt with the question whether adoptees may claim a right to inherit
from their natural parents. An Illinois court in In re Tilliski, 390 IlI. 273, 285, 61 N.E.2d 24, 29
(1945), aj'g 323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N.E.2d 481 (1943), held that adoption did not preclude a child
from claiming a share of his natural parents' estates. More recently, Spillman v. Parker, 332 So.
2d 573, 576 (La. App. 1976), held that the ascertainment of an adoptee's inheritance rights was a
valid reason for disclosure of the original birth certificate. See Note, Confidentiality of,4doption
Records An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 820-22 (1978); note 44 infra and accompanying
text.
7. The reference to adoptee throughout the remainder of this note is only to adult adoptees.
No commentators, sociologists, or psychologists advocate the disclosure of adoption records to
minor adoptees even if an adopted child claims psychological bewilderment. For a discussion of
psychological bewilderment see notes 58-76 infra and accompanying text.
8. J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE 38.41
(1973); Anderson, The Sealed Recordin Adoption Controversy, 51 Soc. SERVICE REv. 141, 14243
(1977); Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, 55 Soc.
CASEWORK 531, 531-32 (1974); Note, Discovery Rights ofthe Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natu-
ral Parent: 4 Constitutional Dilemma, 4 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 65, 65-66 (1975). See also F.
FISHER, THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER (1973); B. LIFTON, TwICE BORN, MEMOtmS OF AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER (1975).
9. J. TRiSELIOTIS, supra note 8, at xi-xv.
10. See Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); The Alma Soe'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aJ'd,
601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531 (1980); In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679, 679
(D.C. App. 1978); Application of Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic City
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law of adoption" and has generated considerable public and profes-
sional response. Legal commentators, focusing on the adoptee's posi-
tion on the closure laws, fashioned various constitutional arguments to
challenge the closure statutes.'
2
This Note presents the rationale for adoption closure laws. It also
raises the arguments for opening sealed records. It examines the psy-
chological and constitutional claims, and the reasons for their rejection
by most courts. Finally, the Note analyzes the current judicial response
to the question of disclosure.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD"
RATIONALE FOR THE CLOSURE LAWS
The law of adoption in the United States13 is the creation of state
legislatures rather than common law. 4 In 185115 the Massachusetts
Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 306, 372 A.2d 646, 648-49 (1977). See also Anderson,
supra note 8, at 142-43; Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 531-32.
11. Katz, supra note 9, at ix.
12. See Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Needjor Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAW.
211, 220-21 (1975); Note, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law,
11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 190-92 (1977); Note, Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons: A Proposal to
Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, supra note 6, at 56-58; Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 139 (1973); Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's
Sealed Record Dilemma, 2 OHIO N.L. REV. 542, 549-52 (1975); Note, TheAdult Adoptee's Consti-
tutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1196, 1197-98 (1975); Note, supra note 8,
at 67-68.
13. For a general discussion of the history of adoption practices among the ancient civiliza-
tions, see Chambers, supra note 1, at 445-48. For a discussion of the English common-law view
toward adoption, see Huard, supra note 1, at 746. See also Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 457,
98 S.W. 585, 586 (1906); In re Estate of Wulf, 184 Neb. 314, 315, 167 N.W.2d 181, 182 (1969);
Kuhlmann, supra note 6. Recognition of adoption would have required the conferral of property
rights upon the adoptee and thus would violate the English principle that only blood relatives
should inherit property. Strangers were accepted into English families and treated as though they
were natural children, but the relationship was not formalized and they could not gain inheritance
because they were not heirs of the bloodline. Upon occasion, however, children who were illegiti-
mate, as in the case of a child born to a married woman whose husband had been away for nearly
three years, were held by the courts to be the legitimate offspring of their parents. II POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-99 (2d ed. 1911). Adoption finally received stat-
utory acceptance with passage of the Adoption of Children Act in 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c.29
(1926).
14. Derdeyn and Wadlington, The Rights of Parents Versus the Best Interests of Their Chil-
dren, 16 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 238, 241 (1977).
15. Huard, supra note 1, at 748 notes that Mississippi did pass an adoption statute in 1846.
Massachusetts' statute, however, is usually recognized as the first because it was more complete.
McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J., 239, 240 (1938). Although the Mas-
sachusetts and the Mississippi statutes represent the earliest adoption statutes, the case law in
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legislature passed the first comprehensive adoption law,16 which pur-
ported to establish "an institution to ameliorate the condition of the
neglected and dependent child."' 7 The immigration movement in the
1850's and the industrialization of the post-Civil War era increased the
number of homeless, abandoned, and parentless children, and exacer-
bated the plight of the unwanted child. 8 Orphan asylums and alms-
houses were unable to accommodate all these children. Religious
societies, philanthropic organizations, and local government agencies
therefore urged that individual families receive them as their legal chil-
dren.' 9 Other state legislatures followed Massachusetts' lead and en-
acted the statutory precursors of our modem day adoption laws.20
Each state currently maintains its own comprehensive adoption law.
Despite the multiplicity of these statutes, the basic tenet of adoption
law is that the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount.2'
In addition, the adoption laws seek "to promote policies and proce-
dures socially necessary and desirable for the protection . . . [of] the
states first colonized by the French and Spanish reflects the influence of Roman law which did
recognize and legalize adoption. Huard, supra note 1, at 747-48. See Vidal v. Commagere, 13 LA.
ANN. 516 (1858) (adoption authorized by special act of Louisiana legislature that held word adop-
tion derived from Roman Law); Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516 (1863) (adoption unsuccessful because
Spanish law forbade one who already had legitimate child from adopting stranger as co-heir of
the legitimate child). See generally Brosnan, supra note 1, at 332-33; Kuhlmann, supra note 6, at
222; Presser, supra note 1, at 447-48.
I, at 332-33; Kuhlmann, supra note 6, at 222; Presser, supra note 1, at 447-48.
Presser, supra note I, at 456-64 notes that adoption frequently resulted from the common prac-
tices of apprenticeship and "putting out" in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, even
though adoption itself was not legally recognized.
16. Huard, supra note I, at 748; 1851 MAss. AcTs, c.324. See Ben-Or, The Law ofAdoption
in the United States- Its Massachusetts Origins and the Statute of 1851, 130 NEW ENG. HIST. &
GENEALOGICAL REo. 259 (1976) for a more thorough analysis of the Massachusetts statute.
17. Kuhlmann, supra note 6, at 223. Kuhlmann comments, "It is plain, therefore, that the
American institution of adoption was sustained by a current of opinion looking to individual
personal needs, especially of the child, rather than to the needs of the larger family or of con-
tinuity in property units and management . I. " Id. at 224. Butsee Ben-Or, supra note 16, at 268
(characterizing inheritance by adopted children as the primary concern of the statute); Presser,
supra note 1, at 465-70 (noting the "'avowed object' of the Massachusetts act ... was that of
'securing to adopted children a proper share in the estate of adopting parents who should die
intestate.'" Id. at 465). The question of the effect of closure of adoption records on the rights of
the adoptee to inherit from the natural parents was raised in note 6, supra.
18. Kuhlmann, supra note 6, at 223; Presser, supra note 1, at 477-79.
19. Presser, supra note 1, at 475-86.
20. Id. at 487.
21. See, e.g., Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) in which Judge Brewer defined the best
interests rule. He stated that three interests must always be considered in an adoption proceeding:
the right of the natural father, the right of the adoptive parents, and the right of the adoptee, but
[Vol. 58:677
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natural and adopting parents."22 States have enacted confidentiality
requirements to further the protection of natural parents. Originally,
the adoption laws did not require confidentiality.23 State legislatures,24
however, concluded that confidentiality requirements would safeguard
the welfare of the child, the natural parents, and the adoptive parents.
Accordingly, legislation was enacted in the 1940's25 to seal all records
of the adoption proceeding.
26
Although modem statutes differ in confidentiality requirements, ac-
cess to files, and disclosure procedures,27 the underlying rationale for
"[a]bove all... the paramount consideration is, what will promote the welfare of the child?" Id.
at 654.
Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925), followed Chap-
sky and declared that the Chancellor "acts as parenspatriae to do what is best for the interest of
the child."
These statutes break from the Roman pattern of adoption because they establish the welfare of
the child as the primary concern of the law rather than the continuity of the family, and are
considered a "uniquely American contribution to the law of adoption." Huard, supra note 1, at
749.
22. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 307, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(1977).
23. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532.
24. At present five states' statutes permit adult adoptees access to their adoption records:
ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68(e) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423
(1972); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980). Four of these states
give the adopting parents access to this information: ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45-68(e) (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980).
25. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532-33.
26. L. BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION 138 (1976); C. PRENTICE, AN ADOPTED CHILD
LOOKS AT ADOPTION 62 (1940); Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532; Note, Recognizing
the Needs of Adopted Persons A Proposal to Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, supra note 6, at 63.
All states protect the confidentiality of adoption information through statutes of one form or an-
other. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117 (1947); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 453.120 (Vernon 1977); Note, Confidentiality ofAdoption Records: An Examination, supra
note 6, at 819.
Three sources contain information concerning the genealogy of an adopted child: files of the
agency (or private party) which received the child from the biological parent(s); records of the
court that approved the final adoption; and the official local or state repository for birth certifi-
cates. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information inAdoption" The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAm.
L.Q. 185, 187 (1977).
27. States differ in their treatment of various types of records. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 20.15.150 (1975) (protecting only records in possession of state and private agencies); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-120 (Supp. 1979-80) (protecting records in possession of any person or associa-
tion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1980) (same as Alaska); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.31
(West 1971) (all files and records of the adoption are confidential); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-113
(1943) (same as Minnesota); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1971) (same as Alaska).
There is regulation concerning the timing of the confidentiality requirement. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1973) (restricting inspection after adoption petition fied); TENN. CODE
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confidentiality remains the same-the protection of the adoptive
triad.28 Confidentiality assures the natural parents that adoption will
occur without becoming public knowledge.29 In addition, closure stat-
utes encourage and facilitate appropriate investigative procedures re-
quired in an adoptive proceedingA° The procedures assure the natural
parents that proper parties will receive the child.3' Confidentiality
guarantees the adopting parents privacy and protects them from any
interference from the natural parents. 32 Such interference could pre-
vent the adopting parents from becoming physical and psychological
substitutes for the child's natural parents.3 3 Confidentiality also over-
ANN. § 36-130 (1977) (regulating access to adoption information only after the final order or de-
cree of adoption); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104(d) (1977) (same as Tennessee).
Adoptees do enjoy a right to see files and records in some states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-10-
4, -5(a) (1975) (adoptee has absolute right to see fies and records); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-
15 (1976) (right of adoptee to see records not absolute until maturity reached).
Adoptees also maintain the right to inspect original birth certificates. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-
10-4 (1975) (adoptee must reach majority before having absolute right to see original birth certifi-
cate and adoption decree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (Supp. 1979) (same as Alabama); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:81(A) (West 1977) (adoptee has absolute right to see original birth certificate and
adoption decree); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-23(d) (1956) (adoptee upon majority restricted to origi-
nal birth certificate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-427 (1977) (same as Alabama).
For a statutory example of attorney's rights of inspection, see ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975)
(attorneys of interested parties permitted unlimited access after final decree); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2279 (1976) (attorneys permitted access upon request); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-25 (1972)
(same as Kansas).
For other individuals who may have access see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2279 (1976) (state depart-
ment granted access to files and records of adoption proceedings); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:81(A) (West 1977) (adoptive parents may see original birth certificate and decree); VA. CODE
§ 63.1-236 (1980) (child-placing agencies have access to adoption reports).
28. See In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 133-34, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1976).
29. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 307, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(1977); People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955). See Note, Sealed.Records inAdoptions." The Need
for Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 212.
30. In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 133, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1976). "Adoption pro-
ceedings" refer to the procedural steps that precede a final decree of adoption. These steps include
the initial adoption petition, agency investigation, the actual hearing before a judge, and the inter-
locutory adoption decrees. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 18.3 (1968).
31. People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955).
32. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 307, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(1977); In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 133, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1976); Note, Sealed
Records in Adoptions: The Needfor Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 212; Note, Recognizing
the Needs ofAdopted Persons: A Proposal toAmend the llinoisAdoption Act, supra note 12, at 63.
33. Psychological parenthood is "the mutual interaction between adult and child described in
such terms as love, attention, basic trust and confidence, considered essential for the child's suc-
cessful development." In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 594, 277 A.2d 566, 571
(1971). See Note, Adoption: Psychological Parenthood as the Controlling Factor in Determining the
Best Interests of the Child, 26 RuTGERs L. REV. 693 (1973). The court held in In re P that, under
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comes the adoptive parents' concern that the birth status of the illegiti-
mate child will be revealed and used to harm them or the child.34
Finally, closure promotes the best interests of the child by protecting
the adoptee from the stigma of illegitimacy or abandonment 35 and
guaranteeing that the relationship with the adoptive parents will de-
velop fully in a loving and natural environment.36
Once the adoption and birth records are sealed, the records are no
longer available for public inspection.37  A new birth certificate is is-
sued to the child naming the adoptive parents as the biological par-
ents.38 Statutory provisions that permit the opening of the records
exist, but vary widely from state to state.39
the circumstances, the psychological parenthood that had developed on the part of the adopting
parents required the court to leave the child with the adoptive parents even though such action
overrode the rights of the biological parents. Id. at 594-95, 277 A.2d at 571-72.
For psychological parenthood to develop the adoptive parents must be free from any fear that
the natural parents will reappear and interfere in the child's rearing. Thus, adoptive parents argue
that the state has "an active interest in protecting and nurturing the growing family relationship it
has statutorily created." Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308,
372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977). See People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955); Note, Sealed Records
in Adoptions. The Needfor Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 212-13.
For further discussion of psychological parenthood, see Smith v. Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816
(1977); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
34. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308, 372 A.2d 646,649
(1977); Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions." The Needfor Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 212-
13.
35. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308, 372 A.2d 646,649
(1977); People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955); Note, SealedRecords in Adoptions: The Need
for Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 213. C. Prentice, herself an adoptee, in explaining the
purpose behind the sealed records statutes commented, "The unmarried mother, the child, and the
adopting parents lacked any protection at all. Reporters nosing about for news might come upon
something really juicy and publish it.. . . Unscrupulous relatives could trace a cbld if they
wished, and use their knowledge to upset a well-established relationship. C..PRENTICE, AN
ADOPTED CHILD LooKs AT ADOPTION 62 (1940).
36. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302; 308, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(1977).
37. Note, .4 Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, supra nole 12, at
543-44. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.8-40.1 (West 1964). See also Note, TheAdultAdopt.e's Cons/i-
tutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1197-98.
38. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1198-99 (noting that in this manner the child is reborn). See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10433 (Deering 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178 (555.60),
27.3178 (555.67(3)) (Supp. 1980-1981); S.C. CODE § 15-45-150(c) (Supp. 1979).
39. Katz, supra note 9, at xi-xv.
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All states provide for some access to the records on court order.40
The majority of states, however, require a showing of good cause.4'
Fraud in the adoption proceeding,42 a need for medical records or in-
formation,43 knowledge of genealogical background in order to claim
an inheritance,' a claim of emotional benefit,45 or a grand jury investi-
gation of private adoptions meet the good cause requirement.46 Mere
40. See Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, supra note
12, at 544.
41. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-417 (Supp. 1980); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (555.67) (1)
(Supp. 1980-1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-8-126 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1976).
See also Hubbard v. Superior Ct., 189 Cal. App. 2d 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1961) in which the
court denied a charity's request to inspect adoption records for the purpose of determining the
devolution of property upon the termination of a trust. The court concluded that "the legislature
has expressed a firm state policy that the statutory closure is never to be broken save in excep-
tional circumstances and for good cause approaching the necessitous." Id. at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. at
704.
42. In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
43. Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1977). The Chaitman court felt
that any request for medical information should be freely disclosed and allowed the adoptee to
inspect her adoption and medical records as well as those of her biological parents. The court,
however, directed that nonpertinent information, such as the names of the biological parents, be
deleted. Id. at 618, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69. The medical information in this case was contained
in a separate and distinct document. New York law does not, however, require a separate medical
schedule for the biological parents. Thus, if the child's medical report contains no mention of the
parents' medical history, essential information may be denied if the court adheres to its plan to
delete the names of the biological parents.
The majority of states do not make the biological parents' medical information readily avail-
able. Note, Confdentiali y of Adoption Records." An Examination, supra note 6, at 845. Recently,
however, states have begun to require the biological parents' medical history. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600.8(l)(c) (West Supp. 1980-81).
44. Spillman v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 1976).
45. In re Carol S., 172 N.Y.L.J. 31 (Sup. Ct.). The petitioner was able to establish that her
preoccupation with obtaining information about her biological parents had an adverse affect on
her social adjustment. In addition, the adoptive parents were dead and the records contained only
sparse information about her natural parents. The court found that "[w]hile petitioner has not
succeeded in establishing the strongest case of good cause, she has established that some emo-
tional benefit may accrue to her by revealing to her what little information is available." Id. at
col. 7.
But see In re Maxtone-Graham, 90 Misc. 2d 107,393 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1975). In Maxtone-Graham
the court permitted access after the natural mother, whom petitioner had previously located and
contacted, appeared in court and gave her consent. The court, however, refused to disclose the
names of foster parents who had cared for petitioner prior to adoption, despite psychiatric testi-
mony, on the grounds that it served no useful purpose and might disrupt the relationship between
the child care agencies and foster parents.
46. Weiner v. Morgenthau, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2110 (1977) (confidentiality requirement
need not be complied with where grand jury seeks to obtain records while investigating private
adoption business). But see People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955) (grand jury's request for all
adoption records too broad and failed to show good cause).
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curiosity47 or assertions that the information is required in a paternity
suit4" or an action for criminal conversation49 do not constitute "good
cause."
A minority of states merely require "cause."50 Some allow disclosure
only if it promotes the welfare of the child or the public.5 A few states
have no standard and require only a court order for release of informa-
tion. 2 Other states give adoptees an absolute right to inspect either the
original birth certificate or the adoption files and records.5 3
The overall effect of these statutes is the creation of an "almost im-
penetrable wall of confidentiality" 54 around all records of the adoptee's
birth and the adoption proceedings. In an effort to confront this bar-
rier, adoptees and legal commentators are asserting legal challenges to
the existing statutory procedures and their rationale.
I. THE ARGUMENTS FOR OPENING THE SEALED RECORDS
The arguments in support of free access to adoption information are
grounded on two premises: first, that the closure statutes are destruc-
tive to the adoptee's mental and emotional development55 and second,
that the states' refusal to allow access to this information denies the
adoptee constitutionally guaranteed rights.56
A. The Psychological Argument57
The legislature considers closure of birth and adoption records to be
47. In re Carol S., 172 N.Y.L.J. 31 (Sup. Ct.).
48. In re Minicozzi, 51 Misc. 2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1966).
49. In re Glasser, 198 Misc. 889, 100 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1950).
50. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
51. See. eg., D.C. CODE ENCYL. § 16-311 (West 1966) (welfare of child); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-26 (1976) (welfare of child or public); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-132 (1977) (same).
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(2) (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.570(l) (Baldwin 1975).
53. ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-1511 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2279 (1976).
54. Note, Recognizing the Needs ofAdopted Persons: A Proposal to Amend the Illinois Adop-
tion Act, supra note 12, at 63.
55. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8, at 160-66; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the
Sealed Record in Adoption, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 900 (1976); Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity
Conlids in Adoptees, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 18 (1975).
56. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
57. The courts in the adult adoptee cases have accepted the psychological-need argument
despite their frequently asserted hesitancy to accept psychological or sociological data as a basis
for their decision making if the asserted need is supported by psychiatric testimony.
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in the best interests of both the child and the adoptive and natural par-
ents. Whether closure continues to be in the best interests of the child
once that child reaches adulthood is the basic question raised in the
"right to know" debate.58 Open record proponents argue that closure is
not in the best interests of the adult adoptee because it may be detri-
mental to the adoptee's mental health.5 9 These theorists rely on a series
of mental health studies that indicate a significant incidence of mental
disturbance in adopted persons60 and suggest that the adopted child is
more susceptible to emotional and social problems than the
nonadoptee.6 1 The studies attribute this higher incidence of distur-
bance among adoptees to "adoption stress,"' 62 caused by the adoptees'
lack of knowledge about their origins and the confusion and uncer-
tainty accompanying that ignorance.63
This genetic identity crisis,' or "genealogical bewilderment, 65 pri-
marily affects the individual's development of self-concept. 66 Success-
ful identity development provides a positive self-image, enabling an
58. Note, SealedRecords in Adoptions: The Needfor Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 217
n.38.
59. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the Sealed Record in Adoption, supra note 55;
Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55.
60. Goodman, Silberstein & Mandell, Adopted Children Brought to Child Psychiatric Clinics,
9 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 451 (1963); Humphrey & Ounsted, Adoptive Families Referredfor Psychiat-
ric Advice Part I, The Children, 109 BR. J. PSYCH. 559 (1963); Reece & Levin, Psychiatric Distur-
bqnce In Adopted Children: A Descriotive Study, 13 Soc. WORK 101 (1968); Simon & Senturia,
Adoption and Psychiatric Illness, 122 AM. J. PSYCH. 858 (1966).
61. Committee on Adoptions, American Academy of Pediatrics, Identity Development in
Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Adoptions]. But
see B. JAFFE & D. FANSHEL, How THEY FARED IN ADOPTION: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY (1970);
Elonen & Schwartz, A Longitudinal Study of Emotional, Social, and Academic Functioning of
Adopted Children, 48 CHILD WELFARE 72 (1969); Kirk, Jonassohn & Fish, Are Adopted Children
Especially Vulnerable to StressZ 14 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 291 (1966); Stephenson, The Emotional
Implications ofAdoption Policy, 16 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 363 (1975) (each study found that
despite the added stress factors related to adoptive status, there was little or no difference in ad-
justments between adoptees and nonadoptees).
62. Wellisch, Children Without Genealogy: A Problem of Adoption, 13 MENTAL HEALTH 41
(1952).
63. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BR. J. MED.
PSYCH. 133 (1964).
64. Frisk, Identity Problems and Confused Conceptions of the Genetic Ego in Adopted Children
During Adolescence, 31 ACTA PAEDO PSYCHIATRiCA 6 (1964); Sants, supra note 63, at 133.
65. See Sants, supra note 63, at 133.
66. Committee on Adoptions commented that identity development is a major psychological
goal: "The most important thing a human being can learn in life is to be conscious of himself as
an individual and to be aware of who and what he is." Committee on Adoptions, supra note 61, at
939.
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individual to function effectively and confidently in society.67 Comple-
tion of this process occurs when the individual achieves emotional in-
dependence from the parents.68
During the developmental period, individuals seek knowledge of
their origins and the sense of identity that such information provides. 69
Because adoptees lack knowledge of their roots, they are unable to re-
solve the problems presented by this developmental period. Thus, the
adoptee frequently experiences a sense of emptiness70 and an increased
susceptibility to feelings of isolation and alienation. This condition
often manifests itself in various emotional disturbances. 7 These
stresses, as well as the normal tensions of adulthood, often cause pain
and difficulty, thus intensifying the confusion and uncertainty adoptees
feel about their identity.72 Numerous mental health experts, 73 social
workers, 74 and legal commentators75 argue on the basis of the evidence
presented in these studies that the best interests doctrine mandates that
67. Sants, supra note 63, at 134.
68. Barinbaum, Identity Crisir in Adolescence: The Problem of an Adopted Girl, 9 ADOLEs-
CENCE 547 (1974).
69. Id.
70. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55, at 21.
71. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8, at 81. He comments that:
The general picture that emerged from an examination of the adoptees' self-perception
was that those who portrayed a negative, non-adjustive picture of themselves, perceived
their adoptive home life as depriving, they were mostly searching for their birth-parents;
and they were given no information or only negative type of information about their
origins. Being placed at a year or older seemed to carry considerable risks.
Id. at 84. See also Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55, at 24.
Alternative explanations, however, of the disproportionate incidence of psychological problems
among the adopted are available. For example, deprivation of a close affectionate relationship
with a parental figure during a "critical period" in the first two or three years of development can
cause adjustment problems. Adopted children are more likely to experience this deprivation, es-
pecially if they spent significant time during the critical period in institutions. This phenomenon
might account for the greater incidence of adjustment problems among children adopted after one
year of age that Triseliotis noted. See Goldfarb, Effects of Early Institutional Care on Adolescent
Personality, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 106-29 (1943). See generally 1 J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT
AND Loss (1969); S. PROVENCE & R. LIPTON, INFANTS IN INsrrtrroNs (1962).
72. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8, at 92-108; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in
Adoptees, supra note 55, at 22-23.
73. J. TIsELIOrIS, supra note 8; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the Sealed Record
in Adoption, supra note 55; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55.
See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
74. Anderson, The Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, supra note 8; Baran, Pannor &
Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, supra note 8; Cominos, Minimizing
the Risks of Adoption Through Knowledge, 16 Soc. WORK 73 (1971).
75. See Katz, supra note 9; note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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adoptees have access to information about their origins on reaching
majority.7 6
B. The Constitutional Arguments
Adoptees, individually and through "right to know" organizations, 77
contend that open access to their birth and adoption records is both a
"natural right,"7 justified by a universal need to know one's identity
and the identity of one's ancestors79 and a fundamental right, protected
by the Constitution. The adoptee's proclivity toward an identity crisis,
or even more severe psychological problems, provides the underlying
rationale for the "constitutional" arguments.Y0 Thus, the adoptee or-
ganizations assert that this denial of genealogical information violates
constitutional rights including the first amendment right to receive in-
formation, the right to privacy, and the fourteenth amendment equal
protection guarantees.8'
76. None of the commentators advocate revealing the biological parents' identity to the child
adoptee. Most commentators do urge that the child be informed of the adoption.
77. The two major organizations are ALMA (Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association)
founded by Florence Fisher, in 1971 and Orphan Voyage, founded by Jean Paton, in 1954. For a
discussion of their philosophies, see Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed
Record Controversy, supra note 8, at 531-32; Note, 4 Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee'r Sealed
Record Dilemma, supra note 12, at 542-43; Note, Discovery Rights of theAdoptee-Privacy Rights
of the Natural Parent.- A Constitutional Dilemma, supra note 8, at 65. Recently two more organi-
zations have been formed for similar purposes: Yesterday's Children, whose philosophy is docu-
mented in Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Needfor Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at
220 n.57, and Adoptees in Search.
78. Note, SealedRecords inAdoptions: The Need/or LegislativeReform, supra note 12, at 220
n.57.
79. Id. " '[I]t is a universal human need to know your true identity and the identities of your
forbearers. We propose that because it is a human need, it should be recognized that it is a human
right to meet that need."' Id.
80. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Adoptees in Yesterday's Children v. Ken-
nedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), also asserted a thirteenth amendment claim. Plaintiffs argued
that, upon adoption, they were put into a "chattel status" and the state's continued maintenance of
that status into their adulthood constituted a thirteenth amendment violation. The district court
did not respond to this argument because it returned the case to a more appropriate state court
forum. Id. at 433. Most recently this thirteenth amendment claim was asserted in Alma Soc'y,
Inc. v. Mellon, in which plaintiffs argued that the good cause requirement "is a badge or incident
of slavery because it is the equivalent of the sale and separation from their parents of slave chil-
dren too young to remember who their parents were." The court dismissed this argument as
frivolous. Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912, 916, aff'd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531 (1980).
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1. The First Amendment Right to Receive Information
Commentators argue that closure statutes violate an individual's
right to receive information and ideas.82 Interference with this right
undermines one's freedom to participate in and contribute to social and
governmental decisionmaking processes.8 3 Such participation requires
a healthy mind, free from emotional and psychological stress. Adult
adoptees cannot fully participate in the decisionmaking process84 be-
cause the inability to learn their biological heritage has damaged their
emotional and psychological development." Thus, the first amend-
ment's guarantee of the right to receive information gives adoptees the
right to require access to their adoption records because the receipt of
the information is essential for their self-fulfillment. 86 The commenta-
tors contend that any restriction on access to information is unconstitu-
tional. The restrictions impede the individual's mental growth and
thus deny meaningful participation in social and political decisionmak-
ing.8
7
2. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy guarantees an individual both privacy in the
82. Note, The Adult Adoptee': Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1205. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp.
859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asserted for the proposition that the first
amendment protected the free flow of information from one person to another in, e.g., Application
of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978)).
83. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1204-05.
84. Id. at 1205.
85. Id. at 1201-03. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id. (commenting that the information is important to the individual in his personal life as
well as in his public life, i.e., decisionmaking). Without this information, the individual will not
develop into a fully integrated, healthy person, capable of intelligent social and political participa-
tion. Id. One commentator characterizes this as a right to control one's body and cites the
Supreme Court's comment from Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891): "[n]o right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all other restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by dear and unquestioned authority of law." Note, Confidentiality of(Adop-
tion Records An Examination, supra note 6, at 828.
87. Note, The Adult Adoaptee's Constitutional Right to Know His OrHgis, supra note 12, at
1207 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), for the proposition that the Supreme Court is
willing to extend first amendment protection beyond the area of societal decisionmaking to that of
individual concerns).
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most fundamental aspects of life88 and the right to make choices about
personal matters.8 9 Commentators assert, based on the rights emanat-
ing from the fundamental guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments,90 that the privacy right must protect the individ-
ual's identity development 9t because an individual's ability to make
decisions is governed by identity formation. Any restriction on an indi-
vidual's emotional growth is viewed, therefore, as a denial of "the au-
tonomous control over the development and expression of one's
intellect, interests, tastes and personality." 92 In addition, these com-
mentators argue that closure statutes prevent dissemination of the very
information that the adoptee requires to make the fundamental deci-
sions protected by the right to privacy,9" te., marriage, 94 procreation,95
contraception, 96 family relationships,97 and childrearing and educa-
tion. 9
8
These critics also challenge the state's claim that the natural parents'
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.23 (1977), the Court
attempted to define the privacy right and indicated that the right encompassed something more
than marriage, procreation, contraception, and childbearing. Privacy embraces both a general
individual interest in avoiding dislosure of personal matters and a distinct interest in indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
90. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See Note, supra note 8, at 74-75.
91. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1208, noting that "It]he core of his identity is indeed more private than his role as a parent or as a
sexual partner, and any interference with its development necessarily affects his private decisions."
Id. (footnote omitted). See also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1970).
92. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973); Note, The AdultAdoptee's Constilutional~ight to
Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1208-09.
93. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutlonal Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1208-09. The commentator argues that privacy embodies more than secrecy: privacy means con-
trol over information. Control implies that the individual not only has knowledge of that infor-
mation but also the freedom to use the information. Id. at 1210.
The adoptee will not always be able to assert that access to information about his origins
is necessary for any particular decision, though that will often be the case where there is
some question about his family's biological background. But he can assert that, without
the healthy sense of self which comes from knowledge of one's origins, any fundamental
decision may be difficult when he does have to confront it.
Id. at 1209.
94. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
95. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
96. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
97. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
98. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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right to privacy overrides the child's right to know.9 9 They contend
that the natural parents have deprived the adoptees of the use and own-
ership of this information. Ioo These critics conclude, therefore, that tort
law provides greater protection for the welfare of the natural parent
than state closure statutes. 0 1
3. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The adoptees argue that a requirement to obtain a court order to
gain access to birth records violates the fourteenth amendment 10 2 be-
cause a nonadopted person routinely has access to those records.10 3 Al-
though the equal protection clause does not require all persons to be
treated equally, the clause does require legislation to be reasonable' °4
or to bear a substantial relation to the object of the legislation.10 5 The
adoptees assert that the closure statutes do not meet these standards.10 6
Adoptees contend, based on psychological data,0 7 that the statutes are
contrary to their best interests. 08 Thus the statutes embody no rational
99. Note, Adult 4doptee'r Constitutional Right to Know his Origins, supra note 12, at 1215.
100, Id.
101. Id. at 1217-20.
102. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 144. See
Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
103. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 144; Note,
Disco Yen, Rights ofthe Adoptee--Privacy Rights ofthe Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma,
supra note 8, at 69-70. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
104. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 141-44; Note,
Discovery Rights ofthe Adoptee-Privacy Rights ofthe Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma,
supra note 8, at 70. Both commentators cite to McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in
support of their discussion of the rational basis test.
105. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 144; Note,
Discovery Rights ofthe Adoptee-Privacy Rights ofthe Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma,
supra note 8, at 70-71. Both commentators rely on Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in its use of
the FS. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia holding that "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
106. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 144. But see
Note, Discovery Rights ofthe Adoptee-Privacy Rights ofthe Natural Parent: 4 Constitutional Di-
lemma, supra note 8, at 70-71. (Author believes that adoptees' chances of success under rational
basis test would be very limited, but under the substantial relation test the evidence of identity
crisis and psychological deprivation would render a contention of state interest illogical.).
107. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.
108. Id.
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basis'0 9 or substantial relation" ° to justify their continuance."'
The right to know proponents also claim that the adoptees are a sus-
pect class,' 1 2 and thus argue that strict scrutiny of the statutes is appro-
priate.1 3 Although the Supreme Court has not designated adoptees as
a "suspect class,"'" 4 several decisions suggest that status at birth may
support a suspect classification." 5 Application of strict scrutiny would
uphold closure legislation only if the statute promoted some compelling
state interest. Fundamental rights also trigger strict scrutiny, and com-
mentators argue that courts should afford constitutional protection to
the adoptee's right to know consonant with the protection afforded to
marriage and family relationships." 6
4. No Compelling State Interest Argument
Statutory closure will prevail over judicial acceptance of the
adoptees' fundamental right to know or the adoptees' suspect class cat-
109. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
110. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
112. Note, Discovery Rights of/he Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent." A Constitu-
tional Dilemma, supra note 8, at 72.
113. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 103; Note, Developments in the Lan-Equal Protec-
tion, supra note 103.
114. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized only the following as suspect classes: race,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage,
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); and national origin, Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Each case, however, involves some condition of birth from which
the argument is generalized.
115. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (suspect classes are those that suffer
from "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth" and have had a
history of the relegation of the class to an inferior status); San Antonio Independent School Dist,
v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, ., dissenting) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of
birth-particularly when it affects innocent children-warrants special judicial consideration.");
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("[fI]mposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our legal system that burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S, 68,
71 (1968) ("Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of
wedlock? . . . How under our constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which
other citizens enjoy?").
116. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, supra note 12, at 145-46; Note,
Discovery Rights ofthe Adopltee-Privacy Rights ofthe Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma,
supra note 8, at 73. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aJ'd, 601
F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531 (1980), in which adoptees argued that
adoptees are so politically powerless that adoptees require the protection afforded discrete and
insular minorities.
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egorization if the legislation promotes a compelling state interest. 117
The state predicates its interest on the belief that closure laws are in the
best interests of the child"8 and promote the institution of adoption.119
Open record proponents argue that the state's interest, which may be
compelling while the adoptee is a child, naturally diminishes120 once
the adopted child reaches adulthood.121 Supporters of open records re-
ject the claim that closure laws enable parents to abandon their chil-
dren with anonymity. 22  These, commentators not only find no
evidence to support the state's assumption,"2 but also argue that sev-
eral states' 24 and foreign countries 125 with open record adoption stat-
utes continue to successfully support the institution of adoption.' 26
III. THE COURTS' RESPONSE
Although the "right to know" movement originated in the 1950's,127
117. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1210-11.
118. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
120. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Orins, supra note 12, at
1211-12.
121. Id. noting that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 210 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) estab-
lished the proposition that the nature of the state's interest varies over time and commenting:
Justice Blackmun explained that Texas had legitimate interests in protecting the health
of the pregnant woman and the viable fetus and that these interests intensified during the
course of the pregnancy until they became 'compelling.' Prior to the point when they
became compelling, however, the woman was free under her right to privacy to make the
decision whether or not to abort. Thus, it is conceivable that the interest underlying the
confidentiality statutes may be compelling at its initial application and yet lose that sta-
tus with time.
Id. at 1211. The court in Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308-
09, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977) accepted this argument.
122. Note, The Adult Advptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at
1213.
123. Id.
124. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
125. Scotland, Finland, Israel, and most recently England and Wales have statutes providing
for access to adoption records by means of a reunion registry when the adoptee reaches majority.
A Canadian governmental commission in Ontario has also recommended such legal reform.
Klibanoff, supra note 26, at 188.
126. Note, TheAdoptee's ConstitutionalRight o Know His Oriins, supra note 12, at 1214. See
Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1977).
127. See J. PATON, THE ADOPTED BREAK SELENCE (1954). Paton, an adopted social worker
who at the age of forty-seven located her mother, founded Orphan Voyage. Orphan Voyage as-
sists adoptees in finding their natural parents. Paton has written and lectured regularly on the
subject of adoption and advocates the concept of a reunion register. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky,
supra note 8, at 531-32.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:677
it did not receive attention from legal commentators until the early
1970's.'28 Presentation of the proposed constitutional arguments in a
judicial forum did not begin until late 1976.29 Mills v. Atlantic City
Department of Vital Statistics3 ° best exemplifies those arguments.
In Mills, four adult adoptees, seeking access to their adoption
records, challenged the constitutionality of the New Jersey closure stat-
utes13 ' that required the sealing of the adoptee's original birth certifi-
cate and a showing of good cause before a court would break the
seal. 132 The adoptees asserted that the statutes violated first amend-
ment rights to receive information, 33 rights to privacy,' 34 and rights to
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 35 In addition, they
claimed that the state could demonstrate no compelling reason to jus-
tify the legislation.136 Mills, and subsequent decisions,'37 have rejected
each of these propositions.13 8 Moreover, adoptees-in Alma Society, Inc.
v. Mellon 139 unsuccessfully attempted a thirteenth amendment chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the sealed record statutes.' 40
A. The First Amendment Right to Receive Information
The Mills court recognized that adoptees have a right to receive in-
128. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532; J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8; Note, The
Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1196 n.3.
129. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
130. 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
131. Id. at 306, 372 A.2d at 648.
132. Id. The statutes challenged were N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.1 (West 1964) (requiring the
state registrar to seal the original birth certificate of any child adopted) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
31 (West 1976) (only a court order can break the seal of secrecy provided that good cause is
shown).
133. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 312-13, 372 A.2d 646,
651-52 (1977).
134. Id. at 309-12, 372 A.2d at 650-51.
135. Id. at 315-17, 372 A.2d at 653.
136. Id. at 311-12, 314-16, 372 A.2d at 651-52, 653-54.
137. Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977); Application of Gilbert,
563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978); Alma Soe'y, Inc.
v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 100
S. Ct. 531 (1980).
138. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
139. Alma Soe'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531
(1980).
140. Id. at 1236-38. The appellants claimed that the thirteenth amendment prohibition of
slavery and involuntary servitude gave them an absolute right of access to their adoption records.
Id. at 1236. The court summarily dismissed this argument.
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formation,' 4' but stated that no constitutional or personal right, even a
first amendment right, is so absolute as to exclude the rights of other
individuals, i e., the natural parents.' 42 The court found that the adop-
tion records required protection and held the good cause requirement a
reasonable method of protecting the records. 43 The assertion of a right
to access, based on a constitutional right to receive information, did
not, therefore, override state policy. 144
B. The Right to Privacy Argument
The Mills court responded to the right of privacy argument by com-
paring it to the first amendment right to speak and to receive informa-
tion. The first amendment right is also not absolute. 45 An adoption
statute would be valid unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, and has no
rational relationship to a permissible state objective. 146 The court as-
serted that "Constitutional and other personal rights may be limited for
the protection of other individuals or the public, and where the abso-
lute exercise of the right harms these other elements it may be re-
stricted." 147 Characterizing the natural parents' right to be left alone as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men," 141 the Mills court noted that natural parents not only have
the expectation of confidentiality, but also an actual statutory assurance
that they will be shielded from public disclosure.'
49
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon 5 ° viewed the adoptee's privacy argu-
ment as an assertion of a right to personhood. t51 The court found that
the New York good cause requirements simply acknowledged the rela-
141. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 312-13, 372 A.2d 646,
652 (1977).
142. Id.
143. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-17 (West 1976) (New Jersey good cause statute). Seenotes 40-
61 supra and 181-88 infra and accompanying text for a statement of the elements of good cause.
144. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 313, 372 A.2d 646, 653
(1977).
145. Id. at 310, 311, 372 A.2d at 650, 651.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 311-12, 372 A.2d at 651-52 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
149. Id. at 311, 372 A.2d at 651-52.
150. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 531 (1980).
151. The court said: "What appellants assert is a right to personhood. They rely on a series of
Supreme Court cases involving familial relationships rights of family privacy, and freedom to
marry and reproduce." Id. at 1231.
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tionship of the natural and adoptive parents. The court upheld the
statutes despite the claim that the sealing of the adoption records "im-
posed lifelong familial amnesia. .,,t, stating that they "do not un-
constitutionally infringe upon or arbitrarily remove appellants' rights
of identity, privacy, or personhood."' 53
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Argument
The adoptees in Mills claimed that the court should apply strict scru-
tiny because their rights were fundamental.1 54 The court in Mills re-
jected that argument and declared that "while information regarding
the heritage, background and physical and psychological heredity of
any person is essential to that person's identity and self-image,1 15 nev-
ertheless it did not fall under the protection of the Bill of Rights."'
' 56
The court found that the statutory objective of shielding natural par-
ents from public disclosure was reasonable and that the statute bore a
rational relationship to that objective.'5 7
The court also rejected the characterization of the adoptee as a mem-
ber of a suspect class by analogy to the legitimacy cases. The adoptee's
status does not result from an accident of birth, but from a legal pro-
ceeding that is designed to protect the adoptee's best interest.' 58 Simi-
larly, in Application of Maples,5 9 the court treated adoption as a factor
not usually present at birth, 16 holding the claim that adoption is a sta-
tus at birth erroneous because many of the adoptees challenging the
sealed records statutes were not adopted until several months after their
birth. 16' The Maples court characterized the adoption process as con-
ferring special advantages on the child, rather than relegating the child
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1233.
154. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311,314-15, 372 A.2d,
646, 651, 653 (1977).
155. Id. at 310, 372 A.2d at 650, citing Reynolds, Eismitz, Chiappise & Walsh, Personality
Factors Dffierentiating Searching and Nonsearching Adoptees, paper presented to AM. PSYCH.
AsS'N (Sept. 1976); Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Reunion of Adoptees and Birth Relatives, 3 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 195 (1974).
156. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 310, 372 A.2d 646, 650
(1977).
157. Id. at 311-12, 372 A.2d at 651-52.
158. Id. at 315-16, 372 A.2d at 653.
159. Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
160. Id. at 765.
161. Id.
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to an inferior status.16 2
In Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 163 the court refused to apply the level
of scrutiny afforded illegitimate children even though a majority of
children adopted by nonrelatives are illegitimate.'" The finding of a
suspect classification for illegitimates is predicated on a conclusion by
the court that "the state has employed a questionable trait to distin-
guish those whom the law should burden from those whom the law
should not."'165 The court concluded that the strict judicial scrutiny of
discrimination against illegitimate children is justified because society
has imposed a stigma on an illegitimate child. This rationale is not
applicable to adoptees, however, because they do not suffer the same
legal and social disabilities.
D. No Compelling State Interest Argument
The Mills court addressed the compelling state interest issue even
though the failure of the constitutional arguments rendered it unneces-
sary.166 The court noted that "an adopted child. . . is not a 'normal'
child." 167 The state's creation of a new home life for the child has inex-
tricably involved the state in the life of that child. The state's concern
for the child is compelling. Therefore, its decision to use the "statutory
shield of confidentiality" to protect that child is valid. 168 The court
thus accepted the requirement of confidentiality as an essential ingredi-
ent in the adoption process, and upheld the constitutionality of the clo-
sure statutes.
169
162. Id.
163. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 531 (1980).
164. Id. at 1234.
165. Id.
166. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372 A.2d 646, 653
(1977).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. "The State has more than a rational basis, it has a compelling interest in regulating
the access sought here." The court found no abridgement of any fundamental right nor a creation
of a suspect class, but rather that the placing of reasonable limitations on the adoptees' access to
their birth records protected a rational state interest. Id.
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IV. THE COURTS' SOLUTION TO THE SEALED RECORD
CONTROVERSY: HOW TO PRESENT A SUCCESSFUL
CHALLENGE
Despite rejection of constitutional arguments, courts uniformly rec-
ognize that the right to know issue is a valid legal question. The courts
are currently developing a procedural and substantive framework to
adjudicate the rights of all involved parties. 7 ' Adjudication of the
right to know hinges on judicial recognition that the adoptee is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. 171 Statutory procedure generally requires
the adoptee to petition the county clerk or registrar. 7 2 The clerk or
registrar enjoys the right to reject any petition, 73 and often delivers an
immediate and summary denial.174 Although the adoptee may appeal,
the judge175 usually dismisses the petition without a hearing.17 6
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re CA.B.,'77 held
that an adoptee who seeks to inspect the adoption records must receive
a full evidentiary hearing before a court can render a decision on the
petition's validity.'78 The court stated that "the time has come for the
courts of this jurisdiction to come to grips with this touching and recur-
ring social question on the merits."'7 9 The court thus recognized the
existence of social complications and risks to the adoptee and natural
parents.
Courts have retained the statutory good cause requirement before
170. In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978); In re Female Infant, 5 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 23 I1
(1977).
171. Inre C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679, 680 (D.C. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761-
62 (Mo. 1978); In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 423, 232 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1977).
172: In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 423, 232 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1977) (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (1976)) which requires the filing of a motion before the clerk of superior
court of the county in which petitioner is resident for access to the sealed information; see In re
C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978).
173. In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 423, 232 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1977).
174. Id. See In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760,
761-62 (Mo. 1978).
175. Id. at 761 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.120 (1978)) which provides that the adoptee
apply to the court for a hearing to obtain access to closed records because only the court has the
full power to order records opened.
176. Inre C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679, 679 (D.C. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761-
62 (Mo. 1978). But see In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 429, 232 S.E.2d 479, 484
(1977) (vacating and remanding for a new hearing).
177. 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978).
178. In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679, 680 (D.C. 1978).
179. Id.
[Vol. 58:677
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/10
Number 3] ADULT ADOPTEES
permitting the opening of records.18 0  Courts have found good cause
when: the adoptees' search is inspired by religious beliefs requiring
them to trace their ancestry and perform certain religious services for
blood relatives;'"' the adoptees desire information to establish their
rights to inherit from natural parents;8 2 and the adoptees are moti-
vated by well documented emotional or psychological disturbances.' 8 3
The Mills court, in dicta, stated that a court should routinely grant
requests for information concerning medical, hereditary, or ethnic
background unless the state shows a compelling reason for denial. 184 A
recent District of Columbia case' 5 held that a request for medical in-
formation constituted a legitimate reason to open adoption records es-
pecially if the adoptee has children. Adoptees must be free to obtain
accurate information directly from natural parents because parents
often possess medical histories that only they can provide. 186 Courts
have suggested that a compelling reason can never exist for denial of
access to medical histories.'8 7
180. Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (burden remains on adoptee);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 317, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (1977)
(requirement applies only when adoptee is a minor, burden shifts to the state once adoptee reaches
adulthood).
181. Application of Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978).
182. Spillman v. Parker, 332 So.2d 573, 576 (La. App. 1976).
183. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 318-21, 372 A.2d 646,
654-56 (1978). But see In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 429, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483-84
(1977). The trial judge accepted applicant's testimony of emotional disturbance without supple-
mentation by expert witnesses. The appeals court, however, vacated and remanded the action for
a full factual determination hearing on the ultimate issue whether release of the information
would be in the adoptee's best interest.
184. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 318, 372 A.2d 646,
654-55 (1977). See Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1977).
185. In re Adoption of Female Infant, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2311 (1979). The District of
Columbia statute requires a showing of cause before records can be opened. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-311 (1973).
186. Numerous hereditary diseases exist which do not become evident until the third or fourth
decade or even later. Perhaps the most common is the onset of adult diabetes mellitus. A British
study of 1,307 diabetics and 859 nondiabetic controls showed that 21% were found to have a first
degree relative with diabetes, as compared with 7.5% for nondiabetics: a frequency of diabetes in
close relatives three times greater for diabetics than nondiabetics. J. STANBURY, J. WYNGAAR-
DEN, & D. FREDRICKSON, THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 85-86 (3d ed. 1972)
citing College of General Practitioners: The Family History of Diabetes, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 960 (1965).
187. In re Adoption of Female Infant, 5 FAm. L. REp. (BNA) 2311, 2312-13 (1979). Chattman
v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618, 619, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768-69 (1977). In Chattman the court released
all pertinent medical information but the name of the natural parents. See note 43 supra and
accompanying text.
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The burden of showing good cause'usually falls on the adoptee. 88
The Mills court, however, shifted the burden of proof to the state once
the adoptee attained maturity; 189 until that time, however, the burden
remained with the adoptee. 190 A court should, however, approve re-
quests routinely if the natural parents have filed a consent to identifica-
tion at the time of adoption.' 9 '
Even though the Mills court eases the adoptee's task by shifting the
burden of proof to the state, access to records is not immediate. The
rights of natural parents also require consideration. 92 The Mills court
felt that the question required a weighing of the adoptees' needs against
the natural parents' rights. 93 The Mills court decided that an interme-
diary agency must locate the natural parent to solicit consent for re-
lease of the information because natural parents are not before the
court and are, therefore, unable to present their arguments. '94 The
court concluded that this procedure effectively protected the rights of
all parties'95 although it imposed a burden on the state. This burden is
justified, however, because the state originally created the adoptive tri-
188. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 319, 372 A.2d 646, 655
(1977).
189. Ad. at 318, 372 A.2d at 654-55.
190. Id. at 317, 372 A.2d at 654.
191. Id. at 318, 372 A.2d at 654-55.
192. Id. at 319-20, 372 A.2d at 655; Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978).
See also Application of Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 134, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (1976) in which
the court noted:
[A] determination of what constitutes 'good cause' pursuant to the public policy purpose
of section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law must include not only a determination of
the rights of the adoptive child and his adoptive parents, but also necessarily must in-
elude a determination of rights conferred by this statute on the natural parents of the
child, together with any common-law rights available to them.
193. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 319, 372 A.2d 646, 655
(1977). See In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1977) (requir-
ing that the best interests of the child take precedence over interests of either the natural or adop-
tive parents). In Spinks, the court held that it was unable to consider the effect of the revelation of
this information on the natural parents because their identity was unknown to the court. The
court revealed the records, however, to the adoptee because she had the consent of her adoptive
parents and had presented evidence of mental torment resulting from her ignorance of the true
identity of her biological parents. Id. at 480-81.
194. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 320-21, 372 A.2d 646,
655-56 (1977). See Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) in which the court
required consent from the natural parents before granting permission to open the records. But see
Id at 766-67, in which Judges Bargett and Seiler recommend in their concurring opinions a less
rigid process than that elaborated by the majority.
195. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 321, 372 A.2d 646, 656
(1977).
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angle and has an overriding interest in the adoption process.' 96
The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in In re Daniel Doe,
19 7
established a similar procedure for contacting natural parents. 98 The
court required that an investigator, either an appointee or a friend of
the court, contact the biological and adoptive parents, deliver notice of
the pending action, and inform them that a court would release the
records in the absence of evidence of "substantial harm." 199 The bio-
logical and adoptive parents could then intervene and demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that "substantial harm" would occur if the
court released the information.2' In the absence of such a showing,
the court would order the adoption records opened.2° '
In Application ofAnonymous, 20 2 a New York court announced a vari-
ant of the Mills and Daniel Doe approach. The court declared the nat-
ural parents necessary parties to the litigation. The court thus required
notice and an opportunity to litigate.2"' Because service of process on
the natural parent was impossible, the court appointed a guardian ad
litem to protect the natural parents' interests in the litigation,2° and to
locate the natural parents and advise them of their rights.205
Connecticut, by statute, requires the probate court to follow a proce-
dure similar to that imposed by the Mills, Anonymous, and Doe
courts. 20 6 Recently, the court in Sherry H v. Probate Court,20 7 not only
defined the appropriate procedure to determine whether disclosure is
permissible, but also indicated the form that a denial of disclosure by
the genetic parents must assume to maintain closure of the files. In
Sherry H., the probate court had dismissed plaintiffs petition because
196. Id.
197. No. 76-Co. 2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Nov. 22, 1977) (cited in Yesterday's Children v.
Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1977)).
198. Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1977).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 434.
201. Id.
202. 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976).
203. Id. at 134, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
204. Id. at 135, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
205. Id. The New York court that issued The Application of Anonymous opinion noted the
novelty of its approach. Id.
206. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-53 (amended by Public Acts 1975, No. 75-170) requires the Pro-
bate court or its designee "to conduct a timely investigation into what effect examination of the
adopted person's birth records would have upon the welfare of the adopted person, upon the
welfare of the adopting and genetic parents and upon the public interest."
207. 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2525 (1979).
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an earlier contact by Family Services with the genetic mother20 8 led the
probate judge to conclude that the parent would never consent to dis-
closure. The judge therefore denied the petition. On appeal, the court
faulted the lower court's reliance on a single telephone call and held
that the probate court's investigation of the effects of disclosure on the
adoptive triad must be "calculated to elicit the present desires of the
parties."2 9 The probate court thus failed to meet the appropriate statu-
tory standard. Current, timely, and independent information is essen-
tial for the court to properly apply legislative intent and to carefully
evaluate the interests of all parties.210
A North Carolina court of appeals appreciated the need for a bal-
ancing approach and commented: "[W]e think the judge should care-
fully weigh the interests of the child and the public, including the
interests of the adoptive parents and the natural parents. '21 1 In addi-
tion, the court must consider the importance of confidentiality to the
entire adoption process. Despite potential adverse effects that an open-
ing of the records would impose on natural parents, 212 the court main-
tained that the best interest of the child remained paramount.21 3 This
court's application of the best interests rule required the adoptee to
present the ultimate fact issue: whether release of the information is in
the best interests of the child.214 The court "weighed the totality of the
circumstances, 1 and rejected the notion that natural parents must re-
ceive summons and notice.216
An alternative proposal would allow the adoptee access to records
that falls short of revealing the identity of the natural parents after a
showing of good cause.217 If a court applies this approach, the judge
determines the extent and nature of the revelations.21 8
208. Id
209. Id. at 2526.
210. Id.
211. In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1977) (emphasis
added).
212. Id. at 427, 232 S.E.2d at 483. The judge noted that protection of the natural parents'
identity was a major state concern since a failure to protect the identity might offer unwed girls an
abortion alternative rather than adoption as a solution for their problem.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 428, 232 S.E.2d at 483.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 425, 232 S.E.2d at 481.
217. Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978).
218. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite rejection of constitutional challenges, z1 9 courts remain will-
hmg, on a case by case basis, to consider whether adoptees should enjoy
access to their files. The recognition by the court of the significance of
this information to the adoptee is well documented.220 The court, how-
ever, must reach a decision that benefits both the adoptee and the natu-
ral parent.22'
The adoptee who seeks information short of the actual identity of
natural parents may be most successful. 222 The courts seem receptive
to a variety of causal arguments documented by evidence of emotional
and psychological disturbance.223 In addition, most courts have re-
quired an intermediary to contact the natural parents and obtain their
consent.224
The law in the area of adoptee's rights is developing slowly and cau-
tiously. The courts, however, are willing to hear the adoptee's cause
and respond positively if the natural parents receive no injury from
recognition of the adoptee's rights to open files.
Kathryn J Giddings
219. See notes 127-69 supra and accompanying text.
220. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.
221. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
222. See notes 217-18 supra and accompanying text.
223. See notes 184-87 supra and accompanying text.
224. See notes 193-205 supra and accompanying text.
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